Matt Mechelen
expedition of General Anthony Lithuania Gielgud in 1831.
Antoni Gielgud was born in 1792 as a descendant of an old family settled Samogitia generations Giełgudowie and Giełgudyszkach. He was the son of Michael Gielgud doctor's office of the incumbent of the Permanent Council, the Lithuanian writer and fieldstone in 1793, the court marshal. His mother was Eleanor of Tyszkiewicz.
As you can see from the above Antoni Gielgud came the wealthy and influential family, which is close to the monarch's power in the Republic which enabled him in 1812 to issue its own expense a regiment of infantry. For this substantial and patriotic gesture Gielgud is appointed colonel of the regiment of infantry troops in 1921 the Duchy of Warsaw. It can be concluded that it was people like Antoni Gielgud was referring to the author of "Pan Tadeusz" Adam writes:
"...- In fact, it was the young Earl,
recent soldier, but that was a great income and your expense
the whole cavalry regiment staged ,..."
After Gielgud in 1814 remains in the ranks of the Polish Army, which by the grace of conqueror of Napoleon, Emperor Alexander I of Russia is becoming in 1815 an armed force was set up the findings of the Congress of Vienna, the Polish Kingdom.
Polish Kingdom receives from Czar constitution that binds them with Russia, a monarch. The first and third article of the Constitution of 27 November 1815 years are as follows:
"Art.1 Polish Kingdom is forever linked with the Russian Empire.
Art.3 krone Polish kingdom is hereditary in the person of our and our descendants, heirs and successors podług succession order established for the throne Imperial - Russia. "
Foreign policy also had to be carried out jointly by the imperial court for Russia and the Polish Kingdom.
The Polish Kingdom in May of Polish troops stationed near the Russian army. This small state
satellites, however, give people the appearance of independence and autonomy, thanks to what the Constitution and its own army in numbers proportional to the size of the state.
In those circumstances in 1818 was promoted colonel Antoni Gielgud is the will of the Grand Duke Constantine, brother of the reigning czar of Russia and the Polish king, commander of Polish troops to Major General Brig.
At that level, General Gielgud he started his last campaign - Polish Russian war 1830-1831. Initially, he / she is serving the first Brigadier General of the first infantry division commanded by General John Krukowieckiego. In the Battle of Wawer 19 February 1831 which is a prelude to the to be held on February 25 of that year the famous battle of Olszynka Grochowska has a good commanding three battalions of the 5th regiment of line infantry.
February 25, 1831 he once again draws the attention of superiors to the effect of leading division of General Krukowieckiego maneuver, which contributed to the change of the Russian commander in the battle of Ivan Dybicz Grochowska. Division Krukowieckiego tied in the battle of Bialoleka February 25 1831roku Sackena Russian general troops, which could not therefore take part in the fighting. Thanks Grochowska Battle of the battle having to break the Polish army and open the way to Warsaw has become a battle of emergency as a result of which was not achieved the expected strategic objectives.
In recognition of the merits of the existing General Antoni Gielgud is appointed commander of two infantry divisions. The composition of the division were a brigade under Colonel V. D Hauterive and 2 Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General F. Roland.
As commander of the 2nd division Gielgud part in the expedition against the troops of General Rossen. He takes part in the battle near Minsk Mazowiecki where his subordinate troops take up the resistance, retreated in the direction Debe Wielkie, giving the necessary time to strengthen the Polish troops in the area of \u200b\u200bhostilities.
General Antoni Gielgud with his division takes part in the expedition to the guards. Unfortunately, because they receive conflicting orders, confused, May 20, 1831 he has been working Lomza. As mentioned Ignatius in his diary Radziejowski, including a volunteer soldier during the four Gurkha Rifles pedestrian: "The Guard did not expect Russian clash with us. The Russians left Lomza, Burning the bridges behind Narew, leaving all the baggage and forage without a single shot. Once the bridge was in flames, residents of Lomza came to meet us, taking our guest. "
During this time, the military subordinate to the orders of Gielgud numbered about 10,000 soldiers. Ordered to march into Ostrołęka where 26 May 1831 ended tragically fought for the Polish side, the battle came to the Division Gielgud late, with the result that he was cut off from the rest of the Lomza Polish troops waiting for the commander in chief decisions.
May 27 approved a request filed by General Skrzynecki the National Government for promotion of Antoni Gielgud, to the rank of Major General. With the Gielgud had been promoted by General Thomas Lubienski, Gen. Anthony Jankowski and General Kazimierz Malachowski.
The military council that took place at the end of the battle Ostrołęckie, General Dembinski, an ardent supporter of guerrilla activities in Lithuania put forward a plan to send troops cut off from the rest of the Polish Lithuania Gielgud. Participants in this project supported the council. Indeed, it allowed for an exchange in the public eye the cut-off defeat two brigades in the following natural osrtołęckiej for offensive operations with the task of providing the planned assistance to Lithuania. The only instruction he received from Gen. Skrzynecki Gielgud was a text stating: "The general march into Lithuania Gielgud podług oral instructions, which will give him a general Dembinski. Generally, body sent to Lithuania to work had to adapt to the current existing situation on the ground. The operation which was to look at planned action was indeed a great improvisation. Defeating
distance 4 miles a day, the group proceeded to the north. May 28 reached Grajevo.
reportedly received from Colonel Sierakowski, whose troops have been kept since May 24 in the vicinity of Rajgród learned about the positions and strength of the Russian troops subordinate to the orders of General Sackena. At this point Sacken in the region had four battalions, 1 seciną, and 8 departments. These troops were supposed to break a branch Sierakowski.
May 29 at 8:00 at the village of Swords driveway Sackena stumbled upon a horse guard insurgent front of the body. The Poles went in pursuit of the Russians in the Black Lake area stumbled upon a whole detachment Sackena. Horse Poland withdrew in the direction of their main force. The Russians pressed on ahead, when suddenly they got under the fire of 10 guns, commanded by a lieutenant colonel position heel. In addition to the weight of the forest emerged Polish infantry. Unfortunately, Gielgud did not appreciate the situation giving him a significant advantage over the opponent. Poles slowly developed their forces, reinforcing their left wing, fought the fight and repel the Russians. However, too slow for this has resulted in the tsarist army have not been to the lake przyparte Black and thus have not been forced to lay down their arms. Using the tardiness of the Polish side the Russians began a rapid retreat.
Russians lost in this battle about 2,000 killed and captured soldiers. The Poles lost about 200 killed and wounded.
This small victorious battle but not used until the end, helped to alleviate a bit the wrong impression after losing a recent battle Ostrołęka. Unfortunately rajgrodzkie victory was the first and last on this trip just begun. Tardy pursuit laden booty gained in the military Lomza meant that it was not used the element of surprise on the Russian side. Do not cut the Grodno Sackenowi way in which the Russians have placed the magazines of ammunition and food for the army. Russian troops retreated so fast that it has already arrived in Grodno on June 2 or three days after losing the battle.
2 June, the Marjampole, Gielgud made contact with representatives of the Lithuanian insurgents. Lithuanians, knowing the status of Russian forces in Vilnius, and the general location of the enemy in Lithuania, advised that went to Vilnius by way of Olite. However Dembinski pushed his proposal to move the Žemaitija. As a result, troops Dembinski moved in the direction of Kaunas, and the Gielgud with a direct subordinate units crossed the Niemen into Giełgudyszkami. At that time, the Gielgud, and Dembinski reports arrived about the strength of General Chłapowski tsarist garrison in Vilnius, there are stores and placed in these stocks, and the call to immediately move to Vilnius in anticipation of the same concentrations of enemy troops in the city.
Chłapowski manipulating the territory of Lithuania from 21 May 1831 led a successful guerrilla war against the opinions of earning a great commander. The news of the march his unit and its achievements spread wide repercussions throughout Lithuania. Reported en masse to the ranks of Lithuanian volunteers. Thanks Chłapowski could start on the basis of self brought by instructors from the Kingdom of the formation of new branches. Created six riflemen regiment commanded by Captain Grabowski and 25 of the 26 Infantry Regiment later. A large number of volunteers also helped to create 11 and 12 Lithuanian Lancers. Despite the rational arguments
Chłapowski no steps were taken to obtain a plan of Vilnius. At the council of war June 8, 1831 at the instigation of the year for Dembinski decided to take a position between John, Kiejdany and Ukmergė, in order to break the connection between the Russians and Vilnius Jmud. Under the hood of this item 2 battalions with two guns, and with the support of 4,000 insurgents had to get Palanga Lithuania, where the port was expected to pick up transportation 6,000 rifles, 2,500 swords, 1,600 guns bought in England for the retrofitting of insurgent forces. General
Gielgud at that time had to deal with the organization of the insurgents. Deluded that under the cover of good to the land guerilla Jmud will You can collect 40 thousand armies and insurgent forces control Vilnius.
June 10, 1831, he arrived in Kyedani General Chlapowski. Again, at the Gielgud called on the mastery of Vilnius, supporting its view reports on the state of the Vilnius garrison, sentiment in the city among locals and the Russian army. At the end of Gielgud, not without pressure from the junior officers of his cabinet took steps to acquire the city and the destruction of the tsarist garrison in Vilnius.
Unfortunately, for too long postponement of the decision to march on Vilna allowed the Russians to strengthen the garrison in Vilnius 3000. Evening, June 14 Vilnius troops arrived under the command of General Otroszczenki, in the strength of 2065 rifles and eight guns. In addition, the division of the guard arrived, and Tolstoy's division would come at any moment. 3-strong garrison has grown in strength to 24,000 troops and 72 guns. Poor morale
Russian garrison in Vilnius definitely improved. We are constantly strengthens its position in the hills ponarskich obsadzając them guns. When the 11 th
insurgent corps with 27 divisions, 19 June 1831 years attacked Russian positions three columns, you were already sure of their forces. The struggle for mastery
Vilnius started at 9.00 am. The mountains descend Ponarskich three roads leading from Kaunas, Trakai and Grodno to Vilnius. Mountain Ponarskie lord it over the edge of forests and plains with his foot. Eastern and northern slopes of the Neris River are steep, resulting in the chapel connected routes lead through a deep ravine, which was the only way back to Vilnius. In this situation, the right wing of the Russian defense was protected by steep slopes, very strong, the center has also been difficult to obtain because of the terrain, but here in the event of failure of the defenders were very difficult to retreat through a narrow gorge. In the center of the Russians put the two batteries department.
most difficult to defend because of the gentle terrain was attacking the left wing. Russians to increase its defensive qualities built trenches and barbed wire there.
The attack started at 9.27. Troops attacked the insurgent groups in central Russia. Twice 7 Infantry Regiment attacked in the direction of linear shrines. Lack of proper support artillery caused the collapse of the assaults. Insurgent artillery of inexplicable reasons, has been fragmented in platoons, with the result that works Gielgud could not play in this battle more important. Bloodless
center of insurgent forces in order to avoid the murderous fire of Russian batteries placed in the center, began to move toward the left wing. Through this maneuver lost communication with the right wing, where Zaliwski also repulsed by Russian forces had to cut back on their own. During the retreat lost wrecked and taken prisoner by the Russians, an infantry battalion. Failed to advance the six battalions of General Roland on the right wing of the Russian army. Battalions insurgents have managed to break into the hills and began to descend down toward the river Neris when came under fire of infantry and artillery Kuruty general, and his right wing were attacked with heavy fire from the center of the Russian position. Roland has incurred heavy losses and its battalions were forced to climb back into the hills and retreat in disarray.
After the collapse of the attack on the positions of Roland Russian Gielgud gave the order to the general retreat. Insurgent army retreated in disarray. The laxity crept into the ranks. Probably the enemy does not realize the extent of natural forces Gielgud. If during the retreat of the insurgents threw in pursuit of intact cavalry defeat insurgent forces would be turned into total disaster.
Only half an hour after the start of a retreat by the rebels against the enemy sent a regiment of lancers. Fortunately for the Polish lancers Russians were thrown into combat squadrons each, so that a Polish Lancers broke them one by one. Second mirgorodzki Lancers began his batch too early, so that before reaching the position of Polish shivered and was easily repulsed. Only the third Orenburg regiment, led correct the charge and compacted on an equal footing with ułanami Polish. The Poles defeated, and the regiment of Russian license. In the pursuit of the enemy uchodzącym a regiment of lancers came up with the Russian horse artillery battery and the gunners began the slaughter. Unfortunately, they got the fire under the customs of Russian infantry and had to retreat with losses.
During the retreat from the Vilnius rearguard commanded by General Chlapowski, once again giving evidence of their talents command.
insurgents lost during the failed attempt to master Vilnius 2000 soldiers. Gielgud after the departure of the Vilnius decided to przeprawić north bank of the Neris River to fill a cordon and Holy Willie, from Kaunas to Ukmergė. In addition, heavily manned Kedainiai. These activities were designed to cover the creation of the organization Žemaitija., Complement and increase the forces used in previous fights and then had to be carried out before the planned attack on the Vilnius Palanga assault.
After the occupation of the designated positions of the insurgent forces to supplement the midst of adopting the local population quickly reached the number 18000th Unfortunately, ill-organized and armed. In addition, organizational confusion and lack of decisive action, despite drove replenishment to further demoralization in the ranks.
That I have already been a participant of those difficult moments Radziejowski Ignatius says, "sadly, we ended the Battle of Vilnius. Powracaliśmy the lighted forest of Vialejka, where during the passage of engineers Colonel Valentin, drowned in the bath. A few days later we were standing in a burned village. Everything collapsing morale. General Gielgud had no head for such important actions as he was our stay in Lithuania, or no longer afraid of authority over him, he would not act as As should any good Pole. Everybody saw it, but no one objected, no one could not deal with evil. Later in the night, the Lithuanians, which our regiment were completed, all left us. Seeing that things are going badly, they did not want to wait for the sad end of the campaign. "
It is certainly too harsh criticism directed at the general Gielgud but it captures the full sentiments that have crept into the ranks of the insurgent body.
To raise the fighting spirit of soldiers, was carried out on 8 July 1831 years assault on the small Russian garrison in Siauliai. This attack was totally unjustified operationally managed to conduct only because the Russian troops temporarily lost sight of the group Gielgud. Mastering
Szawli was to be carried out as follows: from the northeast and east of the strike had Szymaniowski Dembinski, on the west side had to attack other insurgent forces.
Russian garrison consisted of five infantry battalions, a squadron of driving. Russians fire support udzielało five guns. The commander of the garrison was Colonel Sawelskiego Kurikow.
And this time due to, inter alia, poor use of artillery, commanded by Colonel heel, and the apparent expansion in the ranks of the attack failed. Artillery was set just as in Vilnius, also gave a sense a serious lack of ammunition for the guns. Radziejowski recalls: "We finally started the battle of Saule, where he killed our dear Piwecki, commanding 19 Infantry regiment. Here, too, went somehow, without order and governance, each soldier could see, let alone the generals! How do they let it, it is difficult to comprehend, this can not be tłomaczyć military subordination when they saw the obvious destruction. Regret the heart squeezes when to mention the role of elders "
In these words you see bitterness and grief they have made the soldiers to their commanders. Under the influence of the military defeats and losing the spirit of poverty and combat value. At the same time tightened the ring around the demoralized the continuing failures, not paid as of May the army.
Kruszan retreat to take place in complete disarray.
During the war council which took place on 9 July 1831 it was decided to divide the group into three divisions. Hoped that still manages to confuse the enemy and doing a quick march break its smaller branches. Hoped that in this way could extend the fight against Lithuania and Jmud.
Chłapowski Branch had 3,600 people in the five squadrons ride, and 10 guns, Dembinski had 4000 people, including 10 squadrons and 10 guns driving, Roland had 5,200 soldiers, including 12 squadrons of driving and 15 departments. Genaral
Roland had to move to Palanga and download a responsibility for most of the enemy forces, thus creating a good situation for the other two branches to break out of clamping a trap.
Branch jumped Chłapowski south to Worni. It soon became apparent that, and Roland returned from the previously planned route, and soon reached the Worni. But Russian troops dopędziły Roland. The enemy figured in a situation way dociął insurgent troops to the south. Gen. started simultaneously Schirman Giełgudowi march against the North. In this situation, the branch Chłapowski could only jump in a westerly direction towards the border with Prussia.
Fejdanach was convened in council of war at which a decision was made to enter a group of Prussia. Once written down the minutes of the Gielgud ordered march toward the border Prussian by furrowed, Retów, Szwekusznie and Gutowo.
July 13 Chłapowski branch is composed as a weapon against the Prussians appeared branch Roland. Was created confusion in the ranks. Hi troops again seized their weapons and walked back to the border. Gielgud's adjutant rode up to the 7th regiment of infantry captain Skulski liner and a desperation shot Gielgud. Branch Chłapowski eventually made weapons. In Prussia in 2295 were interned soldiers, 240 officers and 2,000 insurgents in Lithuania.
General Roland stayed a little longer. Attempted yet to break into the Polish Kingdom, however, continually harassed by the enemy, and observing the progressive demoralization of its branch July 15, 1831 he left the Prussian border and made weapons. Thus, in the hands of the Prussians gave up 361 officers, 3,717 other ranks, 26 guns and 35 ammunition caissons.
the only branch which escaped from the snare was a division commanded by General Henryk Dembinski. He used the situation, that Russian troops were engaged in investigation of Roland and Chłapowski. The presence of this unit was out of view of the Russians. Dembinski 10 July 1831 roku escaped outside the Russian cordon and marched towards the east. After many twists and turns and the long march, he arrived on Aug. 3, 1831 year to Warsaw.
conclusion, Gen. Anthony's trip to Lithuania Gielgud and Samogitia, then its sad end to the uprising of Lithuania took away the most valuable of its branches. Most involved parties have been incorporated into guerrilla group Gielgud and, together with the survivors of his troops were interned in Prussia.
addition to creating irretrievably lost 26 guns and a large amount of guns that could be better used in the war against the Russian 1831 years empire. Gen. Anthony
assessing Gielgud we can confidently say that this was not the right man at the right place. At that time Lithuania was needed commander capable of independent, bold and swift moves, leaving no time for a stronger enemy concentrations and launch an offensive. Today under the influence of the tragic events were inclined to criticize Giełgudowi even treason and intentional act to the detriment of the uprising, but considering the 175 years after his actions in 1831 we can clearly see that it was a good leader if was the leader who gave them to him to clear guidelines. However, in situations when he had to make quick and independent decisions did not work. Moreover, its too lenient attitude toward subordinates is expanded rapidly resulted in the ranks. During the expedition among Lithuanian officers there have even sejmikowania, which has never any army in the silver lining. Just
rise in Lithuania and Jmud was very beneficial for the Polish side. Thanks to the territory of Lithuania were involved in a significant Russian forces, which could not be at that time used to suppress the uprising in Poland. Are being seriously endangered by guerrilla supply lines of the army of the tsar. Russians in Lithuania could not feel safe. Is regrettable that as a result kunktatorskiej Chłopickiego and policy from the outset Skrzynecki counting on conciliation with the St. Petersburg, was not used properly uprising in Lithuania. The only target that by the creation of the Polish Lithuanian received was to send Gen. Dezydery Chłapowski along with 700 personal branch to provide the Lithuanians instructors. Chlapowski to work while in Lithuania itself caused a great job. Expedition
Gielgud was forced by circumstance Polish troops after the battle of Ostrolenko and based on improvisation. Improvised action so the troops are again in the amount taken by the good soldier and patriot which undoubtedly was Gielgud, potrafiącego not act alone, had failed to finish.
Bibliography:
1) W. Tokarz War of the Polish - Russian 1830 and 1831. ed. Volumen Publishing House. Warsaw 1993.
2) M. Tarczyński November Uprising in 1830 the generals in 1831. ed. Publisher Ministry of Defence. Warsaw, 1988.
3) P. Bauer Dezydery Chłapowski 1788 to 1879. ed. National Agency Publishing. Poznan 1983.
4) I. Radziejowski Insurgent Diary 1831. ed. Publisher Ministry of Defence. Warsaw 1973.
5) W. Zajewski November Uprising 1830-1831 Uprising in Three National Kościuszkowskie, november, ed in the January Zajewskiego. Ed. Book and Knowledge. Warsaw 1992
6) Z. Zarembianka Antoni Gielgud in the Polish Biographical Dictionary, Volume: VII. Work, edited by K. Better, Kraków 1958.
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